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1When Failure is an Option 
Redundancy, reliability and regulation in complex technical systems 
John Downer 
Abstract 
This paper argues that redundancy in engineering, should be understood as a ‘design 
paradigm’ that frames regulatory assessments and interpretations of all complex 
technical systems, profoundly shaping decisions and judgements about modern 
technologies. It will further argue that the ‘redundancy paradigm’ used by regulators 
contains epistemic ambiguities that lead to imperfect predictions about the effects of 
redundancy in practice. By deconstructing the logic of redundancy in relation to aviation 
regulation, this paper illuminates much wider issues about technology governance. 
2There is no safety in numbers 
~ James Thurber  
Introduction 
On 24 June 1982, 37,000 feet above the Indian Ocean, a British Airways Boeing 747 
began losing power from its four engines. Passengers and crew noticed a numinous blue 
glow around the engine housings and smoke creeping into the flight deck. Minutes later, 
one engine shut down completely. Before the crew could fully respond, a second failed, 
then a third and then, upsettingly, the fourth. The pilots found themselves gliding a 
powerless Jumbo-Jet, 80 nautical miles from land and 180 from a viable runway.  
Unsurprisingly, this caused a degree of consternation among the crew and – despite a 
memorably quixotic request that they not let circumstances ruin their flight – the 
passengers, who began writing notes to loved ones while the aircraft earned its mention in 
The Guinness Book of Records for ‘longest unpowered flight by a non-purpose-built 
aircraft’. Finally, just as the crew were preparing for a desperate mid ocean ‘landing’, the 
aircraft spluttered back into life: passengers in life-jackets applauded the euphony of 
restarting engines and the crew landed them safely in Jakarta (Tootell 1985). 
The cause of the close call was quickly identified by incident investigators. They 
determined that ash from a nearby volcano had clogged the engines causing them to fail 
and restart only when the aircraft lost altitude and left the cloud. This unnerved the 
aviation industry; before the ‘Jakarta incident’ nobody imagined a commercial aircraft 
could lose all its propulsion.  
A Boeing 747 can fly relatively safely on a single engine so with four it enjoys a 
comfortable degree of redundancy. This is why Boeing puts them there. Under normal 
circumstances, engineers consider even a single engine failure highly unlikely, so, until 
British Airways inadvertently proved otherwise, they considered the likelihood of all four 
failing during the same flight to be negligible – as near to ‘impossible’ as to make no 
difference. In fact, the aviation industry considered a quadruple engine failure so unlikely 
that they taught pilots to treat indications of it as an instrumentation failure. Nobody had 
considered the possibility of volcanic ash.  
The aviation industry had been misled by redundancy before. Peter Galison (2000) 
discusses another ‘impossible’ aviation failure, this time with an unhappier ending. In 
July 1989, the tail-mounted engine of a United Airlines DC-10 exploded. The two wing-
mounted engines ensured that the aircraft, with its 285 passengers, still had ample thrust 
but shrapnel from the explosion tore into the fuselage, severing all three of the triple 
3redundant hydraulic systems and rendering the airplane uncontrollable.1
MacDonald Douglas had designed the DC-10 to resist shrapnel. Each of the hydraulic 
systems had its own redundant pumps connected to redundant (and differently-designed) 
power sources with redundant reservoirs of hydraulic fluid. As with a quadruple engine 
failure, therefore, the aviation community had deemed a triple hydraulic failure 
impossible. They argued this was ‘so straightforward and readily obvious that […] any 
knowledgeable, experienced person would unequivocally conclude that the failure mode 
would not occur’ (Haynes 1991). Again there was no training for such an eventuality. 
These incidents, and others like them, are significant because all civil aircraft depend 
heavily on redundancy for their safety. If a critical system fails, another should always be 
there to do its work. This is true even of airframes, which are designed with redundant 
load-paths. Aeroplanes are far from unique in this respect, redundancy is the single most 
important engineering tool for designing, implementing, and – importantly – proving
reliability in all complex, safety-critical technologies. It is the sine qua non of ultra-high 
reliability engineering: deeply implicated in everything from bridges and skyscrapers to 
computer networks and power plants. Rochlin et al. (1987) identify it as a key strategy of 
successful high reliability organizations and speak disparagingly of ‘mechanistic 
management models’ that seek to eliminate it in the name of efficiency.  
Although redundancy may seem abstract and esoteric, it is a foundation stone of our 
knowledge about the technologies we depend on and is reflected in all the decisions we 
make about them. It lies at the heart of all modern reliability calculations and is central to 
the way we navigate what Beck (1992) refers to as the ‘risk society’.  
Charles Perrow equates the engineering conception of redundancy with a Kuhnian 
scientific paradigm (1984: 196). Paradigms have almost become a cliché but the analogy 
is unusually apposite here. Petroski (1994) argues persuasively for the relevance of 
‘design paradigms’ to engineering, describing them as engineering principles that are 
common across ostensibly disparate specialities and give engineering a theoretical 
foundation. 
Thinking of redundancy as a design paradigm is useful because it highlights that, like a 
scientific paradigm, redundancy acts as a conceptual lens through which to ‘know’ the 
objects it frames. Redundancy allows engineers to build reliable systems, but the ‘lens’ of 
redundancy, this paper will argue, allows them to see levels of reliability far beyond those 
that would be visible in a laboratory. The significance of the latter is difficult to 
overemphasize. Risk quantification has become an essential element of modernity (Power 
2007) and a panoply of oversight bodies and regulatory professionals exist to measure 
                                                
1
 Amazingly, there was a credible attempt at a landing. The crew obtained some control by manipulating the power to 
different engines and were able to save some of the passengers.
4and verify the reliability of dangerous technologies. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), for example, both demand and verify that every safety-critical element of a civil 
airliner has a reliability of no more than ‘one failure in a billion hours of use’. 
Redundancy makes this plausible; it offers the surety that publics and policy-makers 
require to audit (and thereby govern) the technological world. 
Like all paradigms, however, redundancy can distort as well as clarify. Its simple premise 
belies a deceptive complexity, and those who fail to recognize its nuances are prone to 
dangerously misconceive important decisions. This paper will explore the ambiguities of 
redundancy and their implications for its role as a design paradigm. It will look at how 
redundancy shapes our relationship to technologies, our knowledge of them and our 
choices regarding them.
Basic principles 
The word redundancy has a specific meaning in engineering: one that is simultaneously 
similar and yet strangely at odds with its common usage. Both common and engineering 
usages imply some manner of ‘repeating’, but, where redundancy usually has negative 
connotations in its common usage – as something superfluous and excessive – in modern 
engineering it is equated with safety and integrity (Landau 1969).  
The engineering practice it denotes looks simple in principle. An element is redundant if 
it contains backups to do its work if it fails; a system is redundant if it contains redundant 
elements. This can mean having several elements that work simultaneously but are 
capable of carrying the ‘load’ by themselves if required – such as the engines on civil 
airliners – or it can mean having idle elements that ‘awake’ when the system needs them, 
such as backup generators. Redundancy can work at different levels: sometimes it is two 
capacitors on a circuit-board in case one fails and at others it is the duplication of a whole 
system, such as in the US missile programmes of the 1950s, where the Air Force 
entrusted mission success to the doctrine of ‘overkill’ and the redundancy of the entire 
missile (Swenson et al. 1998: 182). Often it means both.    
Redundancy has served as a central tenet of high reliability engineering for over 50 years. 
It was first proposed as a design solution for reliability in complex tightly-coupled 
systems by Jon von Neumann in his classic 1956 treatise: ‘Probabilistic Logics and 
Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from Unreliable Components’, published in Princeton’s 
Automata Studies. His innovation lay not in the idea of duplicating elements itself but in 
envisaging a system that could make use of duplication by recognizing when it should 
engage backup elements. Grappling with the complexities of building a working 
computer from thousands of unreliable vacuum tubes, von Neumann realized – radically 
– that a redundant system could be more reliable than its constituent parts. ‘The basic 
idea in this procedure is very simple,’ he writes, ‘Instead of running the incoming data 
5into a single machine, the same information is simultaneously fed into a number of 
identical machines, and the result that comes out of a majority of these machines is 
assumed to be true. […] this technique can be used to control error.’ (1956: 44). His 
insight represented a significant breakthrough at a time when the reliability of Western 
military paraphernalia was proving inadequate and engineers were pushing the limits of 
their ability to increase the dependability of a system by maximizing the reliability of 
each component. It was exemplary ‘system level’ engineering: enhancing the integrity of 
the system by allowing it to adapt and compensate for the shortcomings of its elements 
(Jones-Imhotep 2000: 153).   
Although first established as a design tool, engineers soon realized that redundancy’s 
practical virtues were coupled with an epistemological advantage: redundancy not only 
allowed them to design for high reliability, it also allowed them to quantitatively 
demonstrate reliability – something that had previously proved very difficult. 
Redundancy could do this because it offered a powerful, straightforward, and convincing 
rubric with which engineers could mathematically establish reliability levels much higher 
than they could derive from lab testing.  
Put simply, this was because engineers could multiply the reliability of redundant 
elements to ascertain the reliability of the system as a whole. The basic principle is again 
straightforward: where two redundant and independent elements operate in parallel to 
form a system, we can, in principle, calculate the chance of total system failure by 
establishing the probability that both systems will fail at the same time (Littlewood et al. 
2002: 781). If each element only fails infrequently, then there is a vanishingly small 
probability of both failing simultaneously. For instance, if one element has a 0.0001 
probability of failing over a given period, then the probability of two redundant elements 
failing over the same period is that number squared (0.0001)2 or 0.00000001. By using 
redundancy, therefore, we have demonstrated a ten-thousandfold reduction in the 
probability of failure and, significantly, without recourse to lab tests (Shinners 1967: 56). 
Whilst vital to modern technology regulation, however, these calculations are deceptively 
complex. Critics argue that they rely on unrealistic assumptions and ignore important 
variables (e.g. Littlewood & Strigini 1993; Littlewood et al. 1999; Littlewood 1996; 
Popov et al. 2000). Such detractors rarely object to the use of redundancy per se, but to 
the way engineers or regulators use it in calculations. In different ways, they articulate the 
common observation that the platonic niceties of mathematics fit imperfectly onto the 
‘messiness’ of the real world. 
Experience seems to support a disjuncture between the performance of redundancy in 
theory and its capability in practice: failures happen more often than engineering 
calculations predict (Perrow 1984). The following sections seek to explain why. They 
unpack some of the messiness’ of redundancy in the real world, by visiting broad  
6epistemic difficulties, illustrating their relevance and explaining how they subvert the 
mathematical ideal of the ‘redundancy paradigm’.  
The first looks at the dilemmas of complexity.  
Complexity 
Simplicity and reliability go hand in glove, or so many commentators suggest (e.g. 
Perrow 1984). Mary Kaldor, for instance, argues that Soviet technology was often more 
reliable than its Western equivalent because it was straightforward. Russian technology 
was ‘uncomplicated, unadorned, unburdened,’ she writes, ‘performing only of what [was] 
required and no more’ (1981: 111). She gives the absence of powered controls on large 
passenger jets as an example. 
Redundancy upsets this relationship. It increases the number of parts in a system leading 
to more unexpected interactions and leaving the system harder to understand and to 
verify. Modern airliners, assembled from over a million parts, are extraordinarily 
complex machines. The electronics alone are Byzantine. Inside each aircraft lies a highly 
sophisticated computer network with hundreds of miles of wiring linking dozens of 
computer systems that regulate everything from in-flight entertainment to engine 
temperature.
Several students of complex systems argue that increasing redundancy can exacerbate 
complexity to the point where it becomes the primary source of unreliability (e.g. Rushby 
1993; Hopkins 1999). Perrow makes this argument about the Space Shuttle, suggesting 
that its extensive redundancy makes its workings mysterious and unpredictable even to its 
designers, and that this is a source of risk (1984: 270).2
  
The extra elements needed to manage redundant systems deepen this problem. Redundant 
elements invariably require further ‘managerial’ systems to determine, indicate, and/or 
mediate failures (Shinners 1967: 57). Should a commercial aircraft engine fail during 
flight, for example, an electronic supervisor senses the failure, cuts the fuel, adjusts the 
rudder, and compensates for the missing thrust (Rozell 1996). It may sound simple to bolt 
extra engines on to an aeroplane, but this simplicity quickly dissolves if we consider the 
many extra management systems and sensors it entails, any one of which, we should 
remember, might fail and cause its own accident. Even if the system relies on a human 
mediator, that mediator relies on dials, sensors, and other indicators, all of which can fail. 
(And, of course, humans have their own reliability problems.) 
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 Sagan (1993) has found that false indications from safety devices and backup systems in the American missile-
warning apparatus have nearly triggered nuclear wars!
7More than simply exacerbating a system’s complexity, redundancy management systems 
introduce a further complication. Since they are themselves critical elements of the 
system, they too must be ‘ultra-reliable.’ Or, in engineering parlance: ‘a centralized 
redundancy management function will likely inherit the criticality level of the most 
critical task that it supports’ (Rushby 1993: 69). 
Redundancy management systems have certainly caused their own disasters. In January 
1989, for example, a British Midland 737-400 crashed at Kegworth, near Nottingham, 
killing 44 people. Accident investigators think that one of the aircraft’s two – redundant – 
engines caught fire, and that somebody had miswired the – not redundant – warning 
system, leading the pilot to shut down the wrong engine (Krohn & Weyer 1994: 177).3
Unlike at Kegworth, management systems have sometimes even instigated disasters.4
  
Aircraft manufacturers must make management systems reliable but they cannot make 
them redundant as this would lead to an infinite regress. If mediating elements were 
themselves redundant then they, too, would require mediation. ‘The daunting truth,’ to 
quote a 1993 report to the FAA, ‘is that some of the core [mediating] mechanisms in 
fault-tolerant systems are single points of failure: they just have to work correctly’ 
(MacKenzie 2001: 229). The implicit hope is that engineers can make mediating systems 
simpler than the elements they mediate and therefore more reliable, but redundancy 
management systems have a way of becoming highly complex and, as such, especially 
prone to failure.5
  
Even if manufacturers can make mediating systems simple and reliable, the limits of 
empirical lab tests still preclude them from demonstrating or proving that reliability to an 
ultra-high level. Often they can partially bypass this problem by delegating mediating 
functions to a person – such as a pilot – rather than a machine (more on this below). On 
other occasions the problem dissipates because regulations do not classify mediating 
elements as ‘safety critical,’ and so manufacturers are excused from ‘proving’ these 
elements in the same way as the systems they mediate. Either way, the underlying 
epistemology is fragile.
Independence 
On 4 June 1996, the European Space Agency (ESA) collectively winced as their heavy-
lift rocket, Ariane 5, veered from its course 39 seconds into its maiden flight and then 
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4 Rushby (1993) gives a list.
5 MacKenzie (2001: 228-29) highlights some of the problems inherent to redundancy management. He shows that it 
can be extremely complex for a management system to discern when one of the systems it is managing is 
malfunctioning, and which system is in error.
8disintegrated with its cargo of four expensive and uninsured satellites. The ESA 
subsequently identified a glitch in the rocket’s guidance computer as the cause. The 
software generated a number too big for the system to handle and so the computer shut 
down and passed control to its redundant twin, which, being identical to the first, came to 
the same conclusion and shut down a few milliseconds later. The rocket, now without 
guidance, changed direction to compensate for an imagined error and collapsed in its own 
turbulence (Gleick 1996).6
A significant critique of redundancy lies in the observation that many calculations assume 
that redundant systems behave completely independently of each other (Popov et al. 
2003: 2). To call two elements ‘independent’ is to say the chances of one failing are not 
linked in any way to the chances of the other failing. This assumption underlies all the 
simple reliability calculations outlined above, yet, as Ariane 5 demonstrated, it is far from 
safe.  
Indeed, there are many reasons to doubt the independence of redundant systems. 
‘Identical’ elements will likely wear in similar ways and, consequently, fail at similar 
times when they both operate simultaneously. Most failures result from external pressures 
acting on a system and redundant elements in close proximity will likely face the same 
pressures at the same time. In this way, ‘operating environment’ can act as a source of 
interdependence.7An external pressure such as a violent storm, cloud of ash, or flock of 
birds might stress all the elements in a system, as might an ‘internal’ event such as an 
unanticipated power drain. 
Elements can also fail as they lie idle. Even as they wait in reserve, they may fall victim 
to external pressures such as vibrations or moisture. They may also have been faulty on 
installation. Such ‘latent’ or ‘dormant’ failures pose particular dangers because they can 
go undetected. Airlines regularly deal with this problem, as in May 1995, when the FAA 
criticized the Boeing 737's rudder control system. The system involved two ‘slides’: one, 
which did most of the work, and a second – redundant – slide that lay in reserve. The 
FAA argued that since the system rarely uses the second slide it could fail ‘silently’, 
leaving the aircraft ‘a single failure away from disaster’ for long periods of time 
(Acohido 1996).
The engineering problems arising from the question of ‘independence’, however 
significant, are more tractable than the epistemological problems. If there is good reason 
to assume that the failure-behaviour of different elements is not independent, then 
redundancy-reliability calculations become much more complicated because they now 
require a quantitative measure of independence and engineers face the daunting task of 
measuring the likelihood of two elements failing at the same time. 
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7 See for instance, Eckhard & Lee 1985; Hughes 1987; Littlewood 1996; Littlewood & Miller 1989.
9One solution to the problem of measuring independence lies in testing two elements 
together as a single system and thereby getting an empirical figure for how often they fail 
simultaneously. Testing a system in this way, however, does not bring engineers closer to 
achieving the ultra-high reliability figures that engineering standards demand (and 
redundancy should deliver), because the tests are constrained by the same practical limits 
that redundancy supposedly allows engineers to transcend. At such high levels of 
reliability the probability of simultaneous failures are almost impossible to determine in a 
lab (Littlewood & Strigini 1993: 10). 
Engineers must therefore deal with the problem of independence in other ways. To do 
this they usually rely on variations of what they call ‘design diversity’. Broadly speaking, 
design diversity is the practice of designing redundant elements differently whilst keeping 
their functions the same: producing interchangeable black boxes with different contents. 
The idea is that if elements differ from each other they will have different weaknesses 
and fail in different ways and at different times. 
Manufacturers approach design diversity in varying ways. Sometimes they leave it to 
evolve spontaneously by giving responsibility for different elements to isolated design 
teams and hoping a lack of central authority will result in different designs with 
independent failure behaviour (Littlewood & Strigini 1993: 9). Sometimes they adopt an 
opposite approach where a single authority actively promotes diversity by explicitly 
requiring different teams to use divergent approaches, solutions, and testing regimens. An 
example from software engineering would be forcing teams to program in different 
languages (Popov et al. 2000: 2). 
Both approaches are imperfect, however. The idea that different groups, left to their own 
‘devices’, will design the same artifact differently finds some support in the social 
construction literature, which highlights the contingency – on some level – of 
technological designs byarguing that different groups have more ‘technological options’ 
than it might appear (Bijker et al. 1989). Yet the same literature also suggests that where 
designers come from similar professional cultures, and where they have problems 
specified for them in similar ways, their designs will likely converge. The ‘separate 
design team’ approach has its limitations, and we certainly cannot assume it produces 
mathematically perfect independence.  
The same literature also suggests that ‘forced’ diversity has similar epistemic 
shortcomings. Engineers designing dissimilar artefacts require a well-defined notion of 
‘dissimilarity’, yet ‘dissimilarity’ – like truth, beauty, and contact lenses – inevitably rests 
in the eye of the beholder. Harry Collins’ (1985) analysis of ‘similarity’ applies equally to 
‘dissimilarity’. He argues that to replicate an artefact (or process) precisely, we need a 
precisely defined notion of ‘similarity’ (65). When building the ‘same’ TEA laser, for  
10
example, engineers had to determine whether the gauge of the wires and their colour 
should be the same.  
His point is that ‘similarity’ (and therefore ‘dissimilarity’) must be restricted to a finite 
number of variables. To force diversity between redundant elements, engineers must 
understand what counts as ‘different’. Should they use wires of different gauges, or 
should they allow only one element to use wires and force the other to use an entirely 
different method of conveying electricity (and should they both use electricity)? We can 
never make diversity ‘absolute’, so the term always has a bounded and socially 
negotiated meaning, yet the way we restrict it will always represent a way that we have 
restricted the ‘independence’ of different elements and undermined any ‘proof’ that rests 
on redundancy calculations.8
A further limitation, common to both forced and unforced diversity, lies in the fact that, 
even when designed in different ways, redundant elements are often expected to act in the 
same environment. This assumption alone imposes limitations on potential diversity. 
Even very different designs will not achieve complete independence as to how ‘difficult’ 
they find environmental demands if engineers build them around a similar concept of 
what constitutes a ‘normal’ or ‘routine’ environment, because all designs will then find 
the same environments unusual (Littlewood & Strigini 1993: 10). A 20-lb swan will 
stress engines built to ingest birds smaller than 4 lb whatever their design differences. 
A design strategy does exist for reducing the extent to which the environment challenges 
different elements at the same time. It is an extension of design diversity known as 
‘functional diversity’. Systems designed in a ‘functionally diverse’ manner use different 
inputs. A functionally diverse instrument, for instance, might comprise two redundant 
elements: one using temperature and the other pressure in that hope that environmental 
conditions that challenge one element will not challenge the other (Littlewood et al. 1999: 
2). Hutchins (1995), for example, explains how US Navy navigators establish a ship’s 
position using both satellite data and measures of the ship’s bearing relative to known 
landmarks. The navigators compare results from one source with those from another, and 
because the information comes from independent sources it offers a high degree of 
confidence when the sources correspond. In a similar fashion, aircraft sometimes use 
pressure, radar, and GPS to measure altitude. 
Again, however, even functionally diverse systems cannot be expected to offer perfect 
independence. Seemingly different and separate inputs are often interrelated; extremes of 
temperature, for instance, will correlate, at least loosely, with extremes in pressure and 
moisture. Functional diversity also neglects the fact that more environmental factors work 
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often must co-ordinate with each other, it would be a challenge to combine a jet engine and a propeller on the same 
aircraft.
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on any given element than simply those it uses directly. Strong buffeting, for example, 
could threaten both a system reading pressure and one reading temperature, as could 
moisture damage or any number of other factors.  
Clearly, therefore, design diversity is far from being a logically incontrovertible or 
epistemologically simple solution to the problem of independence. This is not to say it is 
not a useful engineering practice or that it does not lead to increased reliability. Indeed, 
experiments do appear to show that design-diversity brings increased safety over 
‘identical’ redundancy. The same experiments also show, however, that it brings less 
safety than we would expect of completely independent redundant elements (Littlewood 
& Strigini 1993: 10).  Design diversity, therefore, fits awkwardly into quantitative 
reliability calculations. It does not guarantee perfect independence in the failure 
behaviour of redundant elements, and so it does not remove the need for a way of 
quantifying independence (which, in turn, would require a way of quantifying 
‘diversity’). 
Propagation  
In 2005, a Boeing 777 departing from Perth, Australia, spontaneously pitched upwards, 
activating stall warnings and startling the crew. On its immediate return to Perth, 
investigators determined that a faulty accelerometer had caused the incident. The 
accelerometer had a redundant backup in case it failed but its designers had misconceived 
how it would fail: they assumed a failure would always result in an output of zero volts, 
but this failure produced a high voltage output, confusing the computer.9
It is often difficult to predict ‘how’ machines will fail10 (as one engineer put it: ‘you can’t 
always be sure your toilet paper is going to tear along the perforated line’) yet 
redundancy calculations lean heavily on such predictions. In principle, the failure of a 
redundant element should not compromise a system, but this principle often depends on 
the element failing in a predictable way, and this does not always happen.  
For instance, on 17 July 1996, just outside Long Island, New York, a Boeing 747 – TWA 
flight 800 – suddenly and tragically exploded. The cockpit and most of first class broke 
away from the fuselage, gracelessly plummeting 13,000 feet into the dark Atlantic. The 
nose-less fuselage stayed aloft under its own momentum for 30 terrifying seconds before 
beginning its own terminal dive towards the water. The FBI initially suspected sabotage 
or a missile strike but the subsequent investigation concluded that a spark – probably 
caused by (poorly understood) corrosion of the aircraft’s ageing wiring – had ignited 
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 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's investigation report is at 
<http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2005/AAIR/aair200503722.aspx>
10
 Especially, perhaps, those designed not to fail at all.
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volatile fuel vapours in the central fuel tank (Negroni 2000).11A stark, if fairly obvious 
reminder that not all failures can be mitigated by redundancy. 
TWA 800 illustrates an important dimension of malfunction that redundancy calculations 
often ignore: failures do not always keep to themselves and have a tendency to 
propagate. This is a straightforward observation, but one with important implications. It 
means that a complete measure of reliability-from-redundancy needs to account not only 
for the independence between redundant element, but also for the independence of these 
elements from other – functionally unrelated – elements. In Perrow’s terms, this amounts 
to a measure of the ‘coupling’ of a system. 
‘Two engines are better than one,’ writes Perrow, ‘four better than two’ (1984: 128). This 
seems simple enough and Perrow is probably correct, but his axiom is less simple than it 
appears. If, when engines fail, they do so catastrophically, fatally damaging the aircraft – 
as happened to United Flight 232 in July 1989 – then it is not at all clear that four engines 
are safer than two. In fact, it is hypothetically possible that four engines could be much 
less safe than two. 
Imagine, for instance, that an aircraft can either have a configuration of two or four. It can 
function adequately with only one engine, and the engines enjoy (for the sake of 
argument) perfect independence in their failure behaviour. The chances of any given 
engine failing during a flight are one-in-ten. (It is a very unreliable design!) Also, 
however, one out of every ten engines that fail will explode and destroy the aeroplane. 
(Of course, the aeroplane also suffers a catastrophic failure if all the engines fail in the 
same flight.) Now, it follows that an aircraft has a higher chance of an ‘all-engine’ failure 
with the two-engine configuration than with four, but the aeroplane enjoys a lower 
chance of experiencing a single engine failure, and so less chance of an explosion. The 
maths works out such that the combined risk of any catastrophic event during flight (an 
all-engine failure or an explosion) is higher with a four-engine configuration than with 
two. This is to say that two engines would be safer than four!  
Boeing has, in fact, come to this very conclusion (albeit using very different 
probabilities), arguing that its 777 is safer with two engines because of the lower risk of 
one failing catastrophically (Taylor 1990, cited in Sagan 2004: 938). Even if four engines 
were unquestionably safer, it would still be true that accurate reliability calculations 
demand an assessment of the independence of a system’s functionally unrelated elements 
(its coupledness), and that, in some instances, redundancy may even detract from a 
system’s reliability.  
                                                
11 The investigation was marked by controversy, with the NTSB vying for authority with the FBI and the latter 
memorably enrolling a psychic to help with their analysis, much to the professional chagrin of the NTSB and 
incredulous ire of a congressional panel of inquiry.
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Even where failures are not immediately catastrophic in themselves, they often cause new 
and unexpected links between even functionally unrelated elements. It is not enough to 
calculate the probability of all four engines failing, for example, because if one engine 
failed at the same time as the rudder hydraulics then the pilot could not compensate for 
the uneven thrust and the aircraft would be imperilled, so that too must be calculated, 
together with an indefinite and incalculable number of other combinations. Even 
functionally unrelated elements can interact; a fire caused by one component might 
damage elements it would never usually interact with. 
The implications of this ‘coupling’ are often overlooked, and where they are not, they are 
difficult to quantify with any precision. This is not to say that the potential for unexpected 
interactions has escaped the FAA and the manufacturers, of course. They use techniques 
such as ‘failure modes and effect analysis’ in an attempt to map out each possible 
interaction between elements. Sophisticated though these techniques are, few engineers 
deny that using them requires as much art as science. Whilst engineers might find these 
techniques useful as design tools, they fit awkwardly into reliability predictions because 
their conclusions are difficult to quantify – it being impossible to foresee every possible 
interaction between parts or to calculate the degree to which one has.12
If such analysis is difficult, it is also vital. The majority of fatal accidents involve 
unanticipated chains of failures, where the failure of one element propagates to others in 
what the NTSB call a ‘cascade’ (NAS 1980: 41). All systems have elements with 
‘catastrophic’ potential (loosely defined as a capacity to fail in a way that might 
‘propagate’ damage to other elements in the same system). Good examples of these, 
Perrow writes, are ‘transformation’ devices, involving ‘chemical reactions, high 
temperature and pressure, or air, vapour, or water turbulence’, all of which, he says, make 
a system particularly vulnerable to small failures that propagate unexpectedly and with 
disastrous results (1984: 9). The accident record supports this view. As well as TWA 
flight 800, described above, several other commercial aircraft have crashed because their 
fuel tanks unexpectedly exploded, such as on 8 December 1963, when a lightning strike 
to a fuel tank left a Boeing 707 – Pan Am flight 214 – buried in a Maryland cornfield. 
Perrow is probably too limited in his scope here as it makes sense to expand his set of 
potentially catastrophic elements to include anything that contains large amounts of 
energy of any kind be it electrical, kinetic, potential or chemical. An element may operate 
at high pressure or speed, it may be explosive, corrosive, or simply have a potentially 
destabilizing mass. An element may also propagate failure simply by drawing on a 
resource required by other systems such as electricity, fuel, or oil. A faulty engine that 
leaks fuel will eventually threaten the other engines, as in August 2001 when a faulty  
                                                
12 In the words of one report: ‘The failure of a neighboring system or structure is not considered within a system's 
design environment and so is not taken into account when analyzing possible ways a system can fail.’ (National 
Academy of Sciences. 1980: 41)
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‘crossfeed’ valve near the right engine of an Airbus A330-200 leaked fuel until none 
remained to power the plane and both engines failed.13
Engineers attempt to mitigate the effects of coupling by ‘isolating’ or ‘partitioning’ 
different elements, physically separating them and shielding them from each other. 
Manufacturers of military-grade microelectronics, for example, frequently encase them in 
ceramic.14 In a similar vein, the FAA require that aircraft designs, (since Concorde) 
separate engines on the wing, and house them in casings capable of containing the 
shrapnel from broken fan-blades. Aircraft designers also isolate resources; for instance, 
they use different computers to manage the in-flight entertainment systems than they use 
to manage the avionics.15
While isolating elements undoubtedly helps improve system safety, it again makes 
calculating reliability more complicated. Like independence, ‘isolation’ is a subjective 
virtue. During the certification of the Boeing 747-400, for example, the FAA and the 
JAA16 differently interpreted an identically worded regulation governing the segregation 
of redundant wiring. The JAA interpreted the word ‘segregation’ more conservatively 
than their American counterparts, forcing Boeing to redesign the wiring of the aircraft 
late in the certification process (GAO 1992: 16).17  The confusion arose because the rules 
were open to what Pinch and Bijker (1984) call ‘interpretative flexibility’: the two 
regulators could not defer to a common and unambiguous yardstick of ‘isolation’.  
Hollnagel (2006: 15) neatly summarizes the wider point: ‘Most major accidents are due 
to complex concurrences of multiple factors, some of which have no a priori relations.’ 
He writes, ‘Event and fault trees are therefore unable fully to describe them – although 
this does not prevent event trees from being the favourite tool for Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment methods in general.’ 
Human elements  
On 29 December 1972, just outside Miami, the crew of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 
became so fixated with a faulty landing gear light that they failed to notice the autopilot 
                                                
13 The aircraft – en route to Lisbon from Toronto with 291 passengers – glided for 115 miles before making a high-
speed touchdown in the Azores that wrecked the undercarriage and blew eight of the ten tires. [Significant Safety 
Events for Air Transit < http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/transat.htm>]
14 Mil hdbk 217, Appendix d. Washington DC: Department of Defense.
15 NASA spacecraft, similarly, observe a rigorous separation between the components and resources that are critical to 
the craft itself, and those that control the on-board scientific experiments. The consequences of the absence of such 
strict fault containment are well-illustrated by the failures of the Russian Phobos spacecraft (Rushby, 1993)
16 The JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) – now the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – is the FAA’s European 
counterpart.
17 Because of this, two different designs of the 747-400 now exist: one for FAA standards  and one for JAA standards.
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was disengaged. They continued in their distraction until the aircraft smashed into the 
Everglades, killing 101 of the 176 passengers. 
The American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) estimates that 43 percent of 
fatal accidents involving commercial jetliners are initiated by pilot error (Lewis, 1990: 
196). A surprising number happen when pilots misread navigational instruments – 
usually under stress – and fly into the ground. (Euphemistically known as Controlled 
Flight Into Terrain or CFIT). There were at least 43 CFIT incidents involving large 
commercial jets in the decade between 1992-2002 (Flight Safety Foundation 2004). 
Although many such ‘errors’ can indirectly be blamed on design (misleading displays for 
instance), it is undeniable that people are unavoidably fallible, even with the very best 
design (e.g. Reason 1990). They get ill. They get impatient, stressed, scared, distracted 
and bored. They make mistakes. 
An often-hidden aspect of redundant systems, therefore, is that they require people to 
build and work them. Seemingly redundant and isolated elements frequently link to each 
other at the level of the people who operate and maintain them. Failures are not passive 
events: they frequently instigate actions. A failure of an aircraft system may require the 
pilot to reduce demand on that system – by cutting the power on a failing engine, for 
instance – or by altering the flight plan, altitude, or speed (Lloyd & Tye 1982: 14). The 
pilot may find such actions unusual and s/he may have to perform them under stress 
whilst making complex inferences from instruments and training.18As such, technological 
failures open a window for human error. A relatively common mistake in twin-engine 
aircraft, for instance, is for the pilot to respond to an engine failure by shutting down the 
wrong engine, as happened in the 1989 British Midland crash, outlined earlier (AAIB 
1990). Here we see a failure ‘cascade’ with one engine indirectly precipitating the failure 
of another because of their common link at the level of the pilot.  
People other than ‘operators’ can link redundant elements. Investigators of a multiple 
engine failure on a Lockheed L-1011, for instance, determined the engines were united by 
their maintenance. The same personnel had checked all three engines, and on each they 
had refitted the oil-lines without the O-rings necessary to prevent in-flight leakage.19
As well as simply being a common link between redundant systems, people can 
sometimes act as redundant elements in and of themselves. One NASA engineer, for 
example, wrote of the Apollo space capsule that whilst ...  
... primary control is automatic, for vehicle operation, man has been added to the 
                                                
18 Military pilots evocatively refer to the confusion borne of stress and information overload as ‘helmet fires’.
19
 Similarly, in 1983, all the engines failed on a Boeing 767 outside Lisbon. The aircraft had run out of fuel because the 
engineer in charge of refuelling confused kilograms with pounds and loaded the aircraft less than half the required 
amount. For further examples of maintenance-induced common mode failures see (Ladkin 1983).
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system as a redundant component who can assume a number of functions at his 
discretion dependent upon his diagnosis of the state of the system. Thus, manual 
control is secondary (Swenson et al. 1998: 194).  
This is to say that – as far as the capsule engineers were concerned – Neil Armstrong was 
a redundant element in the Apollo 11 mission! People are sometimes uniquely useful in 
this role because they can respond creatively to unanticipated errors and interactions 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006: 4). NASA, for instance, could never have ‘MacGyverd’ the 
crippled Apollo 13 capsule 400,000 km back to Earth without the astronauts on board to 
duct-tape things together and otherwise reconfigure the system on the fly.20
  
There is also evidence, however, that people have unique limitations as redundant 
elements. The job of monitoring stable systems for very rare failures often requires an 
unrealistically high capacity for boredom, without offering much practice for whatever 
interventions any failure might require. Failures, meanwhile, can be overwhelming for 
people with less of the ‘right stuff’ than NASA’s early cadre of test-pilot astronauts (see 
e.g. Reason 1990: 180-82). 
Interestingly, engineers will sometimes mitigate human reliability problems through 
redundancy. Commercial aircraft have two pilots, for instance, and the Navy make 
navigation work onboard their ships ‘robust’ by redundantly distributing knowledge 
among the navigation team and making workloads light enough to permit mutual 
monitoring and assistance (Hutchins 1995: 223). Indeed, many complex social 
organizations lean heavily on redundancy, including aircraft carriers, missile command 
and control centres, and air traffic control networks (see e.g. La Porte 1982). Airlines 
even make some maintenance practices redundant. As a prerequisite for being allowed to 
fly twin-engined (as opposed to three- or four-engined) aircraft over wide oceans (so-
called ETOPS flights) airlines must ensure that different people perform the same 
maintenance job on different engines. (An analogue to design diversity, perhaps.)  
Human errors, like mechanical failures, can also be ‘latent’. A nuclear engineer who 
misunderstands the procedures for shutting-down a reactor may never discover his or her 
error until it is too late. Reason (1990: 173-83) suggests that most significant human 
errors are latent, and that this is especially true of redundant systems where – ‘unlike 
driving in Paris’ – errors do not automatically and immediately reveal themselves. 
Vaughan (1996) makes an analogous claim, arguing that latent human errors or 
‘deviances’ become ‘normalized’ over time. 
The analogy between human reliability and its relationship to redundancy only goes so 
far, however. Combing people to make reliable systems comes with unique social and 
psychological problems. Extensive work has gone into studying the interactions between 
                                                
20
 Although, of course, without the astronauts there would have been no need to bring the capsule home anyway.
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pilots and co-pilots. This field, known as Cockpit Resource Management or CRM, was 
born of the realization that when two officers are charged with operating an aircraft 
certain authority relationships and communication protocols are more conducive to safe 
practice than others (see e.g. Wiener et al. 1993).
Scott Sagan, in a fascinating (2004: 939) article, outlines a series of caveats against the 
use of redundancy in social systems. As well as suggesting that redundant social systems 
suffer many of the same drawbacks as redundant mechanical systems (especially 
complexity), he argues they are prone to unique socio-psychological shortcomings. He 
argues, for instance, that where more than one person has responsibility for a single task 
there exists the risk of what he calls ‘social shirking’: the mutual belief of each person 
that the other will ‘take up any slack’ – a phenomenon well known to social psychologists 
(Sagan 2004: 939). 
A closely linked dimension of redundancy, and one even harder to quantify, lies in what 
Sagan refers to as ‘overcompensation’ (2004: 941). The extra security that redundancy 
offers, for example, can lead people to act less cautiously. Perrow echoes this claim. He 
suggests that people may have a ‘risk homeostasis’ in which they become accustomed to 
a specific level of risk and compensate for lower risks in one area by taking greater risks 
in another (e.g. Peltzman 1975; Perrow 1984: 171; Wilde 1994).  
Closely related to this idea of overcompensation is a tendency towards overconfidence in 
redundant systems by their designers, where the use of redundancy may reduce the 
perceived need for other kinds of safety, such as over-specification and/or rigorous 
testing.21 We saw above that airlines deemed quadruple engine failures to be so unlikely 
that they neglected to train the pilots for such an eventuality. As Diane Vaughan (1996) 
recounts in her important book about the Challenger disaster, NASA had long known that 
the Shuttle’s O-rings were problematic, yet they were confident in the integrity of the 
system because they knew that behind every O-ring was a redundant twin, a backup-up 
for the first. No failure had ever breached both O-rings, and NASA considered the 
chances of this happening to be marginal. In an important respect, therefore, the fateful 
‘Challenger launch decision’ might be attributed to redundancy-induced overconfidence.  
Engineers certainly realize that human reliability is a safety issue and a design problem, 
and many manufacturers invest much effort in making human-machine interfaces as 
intuitive, and error-tolerant (‘foolproof’ or even ‘drool-proof’ in more irreverent 
industries) as possible. Such efforts may come at their own cost in terms of 
                                                
21 There is good evidence, for example, that pilots have come to rely on the automated flight control systems (in their 
role as a redundant pilot) to correct their errors and allow them to fly more recklessly At Habsheim air show, in June 
1988, for instance, it is alleged that the pilot of an A320 Airbus, relying on his computer to monitor the aircraft, 
attempted to take off so slowly that he was unable to clear a line of trees at the end of the runway. ‘He was so used to 
the system keeping the aircraft safe,’ writes one commentator ‘that he felt it could wave a magic wand and get him out 
of any problem.’ (Race 1990: 13-15) The pilot, it should be noted, contests this explanation, attesting instead to an 
altimeter malfunction.
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overconfidence and morale: Soviet nuclear power plant operators reportedly considered 
the highly redundant – foolproof – design of American nuclear power plants all but an 
insult (Schmid 2004).  
The real significance of human reliability, however, lies in its relationship to the 
processes of validation and accountability. Regulators struggle to quantify human 
reliability; it fits awkwardly into formal reliability measures, and the people who 
calculate the reliability of redundant systems usually separate human factors such as pilot 
error or prosaic externalities such as maintenance.22 Regulators do try to assess such 
factors, of course, but their findings in these areas usually black boxed have only an 
indirect bearing on their assessment of the technology itself. Most reliability measures, 
therefore, come with implicit caveats, such as ‘given proper maintenance’ or ‘if handled 
properly’. When constructing proofs, therefore, engineers can ‘dump’ epistemic 
ambiguities – points where the logic becomes intractable – by exploiting the interstices 
between different regulatory regimes. The FAA assesses the reliability of the flight crew 
separately from the reliability of the airframe, so if a pilot, rather than another machine, 
mediates between two elements, the proof of the ‘technology’ can escape an infinite 
regress by passing the epistemological ‘buck’ to the flight crew. This need not make the 
aeroplane safer, but – in a formal sense – it can help ‘prove’ its reliability. This has 
significant policy ramifications: courts and newspapers rarely hold airframe 
manufacturers accountable for pilot errors.23
Conclusion  
Redundancy is indispensable to a world where technological risks must be closely 
regulated and where ‘reliability’ is construed as a variable that can be defined, calculated 
and designed. The paradigm built around it provides an epistemic frame that makes 
technology-related regulatory regimes possible: underlying everything we know about the 
reliability of complex technological systems, invisibly implicated in the calculations that 
regulators and manufacturers pass down to the public and policy makers.  
It can only perform this function if regulators disregard its epistemic ambiguities, 
however. Genuinely accurate measures of the reliability that redundancy offers require 
the measure of many immeasurable things, such as the degree of ‘independence’, 
‘isolation’ and ‘similarity’ that separate elements enjoy (which, again, would be subject 
                                                
22
 Simon Cole observes how courts would routinely fail to grasp that the reliability of the people who collect and match 
fingerprints was likely to be much lower than the theoretical and ‘abstract’ reliability of the technology itself. 
‘Knowing how often the examiners made errors’, he writes, ‘was just as important as the philosophical proposition that 
no two people had identical fingerprint patterns’ (Cole 2001: 210).
23 The idea of ‘epistemic dumping’ is slightly tangential to the central thesis of this paper, which is concerned with 
redundancy as a design paradigm. Nevertheless, it suggests a mechanism through which the epistemology of audit 
practices shapes systems and institutions, and is, I believe, worth pursing further. It is intended as the subject of a future 
publication.
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to a similar regress, ad infinitum). Aviation manufacturers could never demonstrate the 
levels of reliability required of their products unless regulators were willing to overlook 
the uncertainties inherent in the frame it provides (and regulators would be unable to 
demand the kinds of proof that the public and policy makers request).24
   
The ambiguities intrinsic to redundancy do not make it an ineffective engineering tool, 
and the dilemmas of quantifying its effects are no different from those inherent in any 
attempt to quantify a complex and ‘unruly’ world. We should be mindful of its 
limitations, however, and remember to ‘think twice about redundancy,’ as Sagan (2004) 
adroitly puts it. It is important we recognize that redundancy comes with costs as well as 
benefits and avoid the misconception that necessarily conflates it with reliability.   
Understanding redundancy as a deeply entrenched design paradigm helps illuminate the 
complex epistemic relationship between risk and regulation, and adds weight to Porter’s 
(1995) argument that an over-emphasis on ‘hard’ numbers may distort the information we 
use to make important choices about modernity. The fact that aeroplane manufacturers 
operate under a regulatory regime that demands quantitative proof of aeroplane 
reliability, for instance, means that redundancy’s utility for quantitatively demonstrating 
such proof almost forces designers to use it, even where it might be more rather than less
risky to do so.  
More significantly, the constrictive lens of the redundancy paradigm fosters a misleading 
understanding of the technologies we depend on. Aircraft in operation generally prove to 
be as safe as regulators predict, but, despite appearances to the contrary, regulatory surety 
in new aircraft designs owes relatively little to quantitative reliability calculations. In 
practice, FAA reliability assessments lean much more heavily on ‘legacy’ data than on 
the a priori calculations that invoke redundancy. In other words, the regulators have 
extensive data about the performance of previous aircraft and are careful to ensure the 
safety of new designs by requiring that they closely resemble their predecessors (see 
Downer 2007). In this instance, therefore, reliability calculations are largely 
performative: they satisfy a popular misconception that technologies should be 
objectively and quantitatively ‘knowable’ (see Wynne 1988). In doing so, however, they 
perpetuate and reify that misconception. Few complex technologies have the long and 
painful legacy of civil aircraft, and so their regulators are forced to rely on redundancy 
calculations much more directly.  
In technological domains where innovation is less incremental and experience is 
shallower, therefore, the paradigms become commensurately more significant. Where 
regulators must assess the reliability of complex technologies in these circumstances, the 
numbers they generate inevitably reflect the distortions of the paradigms through which 
                                                
24 This is a problem shared between manufacturers and regulators. Regulators cannot simply disqualify every aircraft 
because of epistemic uncertainties.
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they frame their calculations. This is unavoidable; but we, as users, citizens and policy 
makers should learn to treat such calculations with an appropriate degree of 
circumspection. As one engineer put it: 
The key to a reliable design is understanding. Not materials, not fancy 
manufacturing processes, not computer controls, not nifty feedback loops. Just 
simple human understanding. [...] really, it does all get down to who is doing what 
to whom and how they are doing it.
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